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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Martel v. Clair,1 the Supreme Court will once again confront the 
conflict between promoting the fair imposition of the death penalty 
and ensuring the finality of criminal sentences. On one hand, the State 
of California has pursued the execution of its judgment against 
Kenneth Clair for nineteen years.2 On the other hand, Clair has spent 
those years repeatedly contesting the State’s lack of evidence.3 When 
Clair requested to substitute his legal counsel during federal habeas 
corpus proceedings, questions about the appropriate standard for 
substitution of counsel in federal capital habeas cases exacerbated the 
conflict. The resolution of Martel, therefore, likely will feature that 
tension and depend on which the Court finds more compelling: the 
recent trend in habeas litigation of limiting opportunities for relief or 
the availability of substitution of counsel for non-capital petitioners. 
II. FACTS 
In 1994, the Respondent, Kenneth Clair, filed a federal habeas 
corpus petition contesting his 1987 state conviction of murder with 
the special circumstance of burglary, for which he received the death 
penalty.4 After exhausting state remedies, Clair returned to federal 
 
* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  Clair v. Ayres, 403 Fed. App’x 276, 279 (9th Cir. 2010), cert granted sub nom. Martel v. 
Clair, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (No. 10-1265). 
 2.  See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 4, Martel v. Clair, No. 10-1265 (U.S. Sept. 9, 
2011) (stating that the California Supreme Court affirmed Clair’s death sentence in 1992). 
 3.  Id. at 4–12. 
 4.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Martel, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (No. 10-1265). 
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court to litigate his case with a court-appointed federal public 
defender (FPD).5 The habeas petition included claims of juror 
misconduct and procedural and strategic errors made by trial counsel 
at both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial.6 
On March 16, 2005, Clair sent a letter to the district court 
expressing his dissatisfaction with the FPD’s treatment of his case.7 
The district court asked both parties to “state their positions 
concerning the letter.”8 On April 26, the FPD informed the court of 
Clair’s willingness for counsel to continue his representation, but that 
Clair reserved the right to “reexamine the issue of representation at 
the conclusion of the proceeding in [the District] Court.”9 In light of 
this communication, the court took no further action on Clair’s 
letter.10 
Clair again requested the appointment of new counsel in a letter 
dated June 16, 2005.11 Clair reasserted his prior grievances and added 
a new allegation: that his counsel had failed to pursue physical 
evidence once it was made available by the State.12 Fourteen days 
later, the district court declined to substitute counsel, noting that “it 
appear[ed] that petitioner’s counsel [was] doing a proper job” and “no 
conflict of interest or inadequacy of counsel [was] shown.”13 On the 
same day, the court issued an order rejecting all of Clair’s habeas 
claims.14 
The FPD filed a notice of appeal from the denial of Clair’s habeas 
petition and Clair filed a pro se notice of appeal from the denial of his 
motion to substitute counsel.15 Responding to an inquiry from the 
Ninth Circuit, the FPD expressed an inability to continue working 
with Clair.16 The court construed the communication as a motion to 
withdraw––which it granted––and appointed new counsel for Clair.17 
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Martel, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (No. 
10-1265). 
 7.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 6. 
 8.  Joint App’x at 18, Martel, No. 10-1265 (U.S. Sept. 9, 2011). 
 9.  Id. at 26–27. 
 10.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 6. 
 11.  Joint App’x, supra note 8, at 62–63. 
 12.  Id. at 62–70. 
 13.  Id. at 61. 
 14.  Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 3. 
 15.  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 7–8. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
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While the appeal from the denial of the habeas petition was 
pending, Clair’s new counsel filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from 
judgment on the grounds of newly discovered, untested evidence and 
the district court’s improper denial of Clair’s request for new federal 
habeas counsel.18 The district court denied the motion on the merits,19 
holding that Clair failed to explain how the desired testing would 
advance any of the claims in his habeas petition.20 After the district 
court’s denial of the 60(b) motion, state post-conviction proceedings 
resulted in DNA testing of the physical evidence, which revealed 
fingerprints and male DNA that did not belong to Clair.21 Clair 
appealed the denial of his 60(b) motion.22 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Although the Supreme Court has determined that the 
constitutional right to counsel enjoyed by criminal defendants at trial 
does not apply to habeas petitioners,23 Congress has exercised its 
legislative discretion to provide capital petitioners with a statutory 
entitlement to counsel.24 Congress did not articulate the appropriate 
standard for substitution of counsel, leading courts to question 
whether it should be based on the standard for inadequate 
performance at trial, the standard for discretionary appointments of 
counsel, or, perhaps, a different standard completely. Nevertheless, 
Congress has expressed its intent both to reduce delays in habeas 
proceedings and to improve fairness in implementing the death 
penalty.25 
 
 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 9. 
 21.  Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 6, at 12–13. 
 22.  Id. at 4. 
 23.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 24.  18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3006A, 3599 (West 2011). 
 25.  See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (stating that the purpose of 
AEDPA was “to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, 
particularly in capital cases” in view of principles of “comity, finality and federalism” (quoting 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000) (Stevens, J.))); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 
855 (1994) (noting that Congress intended petitioners to have access to “quality legal 
representation”). 
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A. The Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial 
Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right26 to “the 
effective assistance of competent counsel.”27 To obtain relief from an 
adverse judgment based on counsel’s inadequate performance, a 
criminal appellant must show both a deficient performance and a 
resulting prejudice.28 First, counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.29 For example, the 
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel mandates that counsel 
“make reasonable investigations” or “make a reasonable decision that 
makes particular investigations unnecessary.”30 In assessing counsel’s 
performance, courts must strive to “eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight . . . and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective 
at the time.”31 Courts are “highly deferential,” therefore, when 
scrutinizing counsels’ decisions and begin with a presumption that 
they were reasonable.32 
Second, even if the defendant’s representation was objectively 
unreasonable, in order to gain relief from judgment, the 
representation must have been so poor as to prejudice the outcome.33 
In certain contexts, such prejudice is so likely that a case-by-case 
inquiry is unnecessary and courts will assume prejudice.34 For 
example, actual or constructive denial of counsel,35 state interference 
with counsel’s assistance,36 and an actual conflict of interest37 all 
present circumstances under which prejudice is presumed.38 Aside 
from these extraordinary contexts, however, the defendant normally 
must show more than a “conceivable effect on the outcome of the 
 
 26.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 27.  McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
 28.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 29.  Id. at 687–88. 
 30.  Id. at 691. 
 31.  Id. at 689. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 687. 
 34.  Id. at 692. 
 35.  For example, prejudice is presumed where counsel fails to file a notice of appeal 
without the respondent’s consent. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 473, 484 (2000). 
 36.  See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 (2011) (holding that an order 
preventing the defendant from consulting his counsel during an overnight recess was 
prejudicial). 
 37.  See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978) (holding that “whenever a 
trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection, reversal is 
automatic”). 
 38.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
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proceeding.”39 The benchmark for determining prejudice is whether 
counsel “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result.”40 
B. The Right to Counsel and the Standard for Substitution in Post-
Conviction Proceedings 
There is no constitutional right to counsel when petitioning for 
habeas corpus relief.41 A habeas petitioner’s due process rights are 
“not parallel to a trial right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the 
fact that he has already been found guilty at a fair trial, and has only a 
limited interest in post-conviction relief.”42 In Pennsylvania v. Finley,43 
the Supreme Court held that providing prisoners assistance of counsel 
in post-conviction proceedings does not require “the full panoply of 
procedural protections that the Constitution requires” for criminal 
trials and appeals.44 This leaves legislatures with substantial discretion 
in their choices regarding post-conviction assistance of counsel.45 
Congress set forth the basic scheme for federal habeas corpus 
writs contesting state custody in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.46 Under that statute, 
subsection (i) provides that the ineffectiveness of counsel during post-
conviction proceedings is not a ground for relief in § 2254 
proceedings.47 Separate provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 2261 govern certain 
expedited capital cases,48 and although they mirror § 2254’s preclusion 
of relief for ineffectiveness of counsel, the provisions also stipulate 
that the limit on relief shall not prevent the replacement of ineffective 
counsel.49 
The rules governing assistance of counsel for indigent federal 
habeas petitioners are set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A and 3599.50 
Section 3006A allows courts discretion to appoint counsel for indigent 
 
 39.  Id. at 693. 
 40.  Id. at 686. 
 41.  See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7–15 (1989). 
 42.  Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320 
(2009). 
 43.  481 U.S. 551 (1987). 
 44.  Id. at 559. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2011). 
 47.  Id. § 2254(i). 
 48.  Id. § 2261. 
 49.  Id. § 2261(e). 
 50.  18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3006A, 3599 (West 2011). 
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non-capital defendants and provides for substitution of counsel in the 
interests of justice.51 That discretion does not extend to capital 
defendants, who have a mandatory right to assistance of counsel 
under § 3599.52 The statutory entitlement arose out of Congress’s 
desire to “promot[e] fundamental fairness in the imposition of the 
death penalty” by providing capital habeas defendants with “quality 
legal representation.”53 Although both statutes provide for 
substitution of counsel, § 3599, unlike § 3006A, does not articulate a 
standard for when substitution is appropriate.54 
C. AEDPA’s Effect on Habeas Petitions 
Courts and legislatures alike have been concerned about the 
abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. Those concerns, apparent in 
judicial decisions,55 spurred the enactment of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).56 The Act’s purpose is “to 
reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, 
particularly in capital cases”57 in view of principles of “comity, finality 
and federalism.”58 
AEDPA imposes significant restrictions on a prisoner’s second or 
subsequent habeas petitions. First, courts must dismiss any claim 
already adjudicated in relation to a previous petition.59 Second, any 
new claims must be dismissed unless they “rel[y] on either a new and 
retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high 
 
 51.  Id. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), (c). 
 52.  Id. § 3599. Capital petitioner’s right to counsel was previously located at § 848(q), but 
was recodified without other changes by the Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of 2005, 
PUB. L. NO. 109-177, § 222, 120 Stat. 230, 231. 
 53.  McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855, 859 (1994). 
 54.  See § 3599(e) (“Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s own 
motion or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so appointed shall represent the 
defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings . . . .”). 
 55.  See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991) (“The doctrine of abuse of the 
writ defines the circumstances in which federal courts decline to entertain a claim presented for 
the first time in a second or subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”); Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) (stating that federal habeas is not “a means by which a 
defendant is entitled to delay an execution indefinitely”). 
 56.  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
 57.  Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 386 (2000) (Stevens, J.)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-23 at 10 (1995) (“[C]apital defendants 
and their counsel have a unique incentive to keep litigation going by any possible means.”). 
 58. Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)). 
 59.  Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529–30 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(1) 
(West 2011)). 
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probability of actual innocence.”60 These restrictions apply to Rule 
60(b) motions, which present new claims for relief, present new 
evidence in support of a claim already litigated, or rely on a purported 
change in the substantive law.61 Furthermore, even in some 
circumstances where AEDPA does not govern, “a court of appeals 
must exercise its discretion in a manner consistent with the objects of 
the statute.”62 
The Supreme Court has yet to determine which standard is 
applicable to capital habeas petitioners, and Congress has not given 
direction more explicit than the observed dual purposes of ensuring 
fairness and reducing delays. 
IV. HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit consolidated Clair’s appeals.63 The court 
distinguished between a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 
and a claim that the district court failed to exercise its discretion,64 
treating Clair’s appeal of the district court’s denial of his habeas 
petition as the latter.65 Because it ruled favorably on this claim, the 
court did not reach Clair’s appeal of the denial of his Rule 60(b) 
motion or his request to file a successive petition.66 
Although § 3599 does not provide a standard for substitution of 
counsel, the court determined that Congress must have intended 
capital petitioners to have at least as much opportunity to substitute 
their counsel as non-capital petitioners.67 This determination arose out 
of the importance Congress placed on providing capital petitioners 
with “quality legal representation” due to the “seriousness of the 
possible penalty.”68 To effectuate Congress’s intent, the court applied 
the interests-of-justice standard—the same standard applied to 
 
 60.  Id. (citing U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(2) (West 2011)). 
 61.  Id. at 531. 
 62.  See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554 (1998) (exercising discretion consistent 
with the objectives of AEDPA by holding that a motion to recall mandate was a successive 
petition). 
 63.  Brief for Respondent at 14, Martel v. Clair, No. 10-1265 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2011). Clair 
appealed the denials of his request for substitution of counsel and his rule 60(b) motion as well 
as requested leave to file a successive petition. Id. at 12–14. 
 64.  Clair v. Ayers, 403 Fed. App’x 276, 279 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 65.  Id. at 277, 279. 
 66.  See id. at 279. 
 67.  Id. at 277–78. 
 68.  Id. (quoting McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855 (1994)). 
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substitution of counsel requests for non-capital habeas defendants.69 
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion 
either by failing to apply the interests-of-justice standard or by 
applying it in “an implausible, illogical or unreasonable manner.”70 
According to the Ninth Circuit, the untested physical evidence 
allegedly located by Clair’s private investigator “was potentially of 
great importance to Clair’s habeas petition.”71 The court noted that 
Clair’s conviction “was based on circumstantial evidence” before 
DNA testing was prevalent.72 Because Clair’s allegations “implicated 
the fairness of the proceeding,” assessing whether substitution of 
counsel was in the interests of justice necessitated some inquiry into 
those allegations.73 By not investigating, the district court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion “without explanation.”74 
According to the court, the district court’s abuse of discretion 
“foreclosed the possibility that different counsel” might have taken 
steps that would lead to incorporating the new evidence into Clair’s 
original habeas petition.75 The court therefore vacated the denial of 
Clair’s request for new counsel and the subsequent denial of his 
habeas petition.76 The court then determined “the most reasonable 
solution” was to treat Clair’s current counsel as if he were the counsel 
who might have been appointed had the district court properly 
exercised its discretion.77 The appellate court also directed the district 
court to consider any submissions, “including any requests from 
counsel to amend the petition to add claims based on or related to the 
new evidence,” as if made prior to the vacated ruling.78 
V. ARGUMENTS 
The dispute in Martel v. Clair has two dimensions. First, the State 
and Clair disagree about which standard should govern substitution 
 
 69.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (West 2011)). 
 70.  Id. at 278. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. The court noted that Clair’s 60(b) motion raised similar issues, but that such 
motions are adjudicated under a standard less favorable to Clair. Id. at 279 n.1. 
 76.  Id. at 279. 
 77.  Id. (citing Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1301–02 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing a new 
attorney to advance claims the previous attorney overlooked to avoid the unfair result of having 
to raise them in a subsequent petition)). 
 78.  Id. 
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of counsel for capital habeas petitioners. The State argues that 
substitution is only appropriate in three specific circumstances. Clair 
counters that the more generous interests-of-justice standard should 
apply. Second, assuming the interests-of-justice standard did apply, the 
parties disagree over whether the district court abused its discretion 
and whether the Ninth Circuit should have remanded for a more 
limited inquiry. 
A. Determining the Standard for Substitution of Counsel 
The State argues that substitution of counsel in capital habeas 
cases is available only when a petitioner promptly complains that his 
counsel (1) is unqualified under the statute; (2) has a disabling conflict 
of interest; or (3) has completely abandoned the case.79 To advance 
this restrictive standard, the State claims that concerns about the 
abuse of habeas corpus apply with particular force to petitioners’ 
motions to substitute counsel.80 The State argues that these concerns, 
in conjunction with Congress’s approach of creating separate 
statutory schemes for appointment of counsel in capital and non-
capital cases, mandate an exacting standard for substitution of counsel 
in cases like Clair’s.81 
According to the State, because traditional concerns of abuse cast 
suspicion on delay, limits on the ability to substitute counsel are 
embedded in the statutory scheme governing appointment of 
counsel.82 First, the State argues that by removing the appointment of 
counsel in capital habeas petitions from the discretionary purview of 
the district courts, Congress “singled out” such cases for “unique 
treatment” and intended “to create a separate system of specialized 
rules.”83 The State substantiates its theory of separate systems by 
pointing to statutory differences between capital and non-capital 
appointment of counsel.84 For example, only non-capital appointment 
of counsel statutes stipulate an interests-of-justice standard for 
 
 79.  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 17. The State also asserts that “habeas 
counsel does not abandon a client as long as counsel independently reviews the record of the 
case.” Id. at 38 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558 (1987)). 
 80.  Id. at 20–22. 
 81.  Id. at 31–32. 
 82.  Id. at 22. 
 83.  Id. at 24. 
 84.  See id. at 25 (emphasizing differences in required qualifications, the timing of 
appointment and expense authorization, counsel compensation, and representation in state 
proceedings). 
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substituting counsel.85 
Second, despite the lack of “explicit guidance” from the statute, 
the State characterizes § 3599(e) as implying a higher standard than 
that in non-capital collateral attacks.86 The State rationalizes 
Congress’s neglect to articulate the higher standard as a result of its 
presumed awareness that there is no constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel in habeas petitions.87 Congress therefore could 
have assumed that appointed counsel’s performance would not be 
open to attacks for ineffective assistance.88 Additionally, the statute 
contemplates, according to the State, “long-term appointments of 
indefinite duration,” thus evincing an intention to “minimize the 
necessity and the occasion for substitution of counsel.”89 Finally, the 
State argues that although both §§ 2254 and 2261 specify that 
ineffectiveness of counsel during post-conviction proceedings is not a 
ground for relief, only the latter stipulates that this limit will not 
preclude the appointment of different counsel on such grounds.90 This 
difference suggests that Congress did not intend for ineffectiveness of 
counsel to be a ground for substitution.91 
The State also makes numerous policy overtures, emphasizing that 
substitution of counsel, unless limited in scope, would have a 
“deleterious effect” on the timeliness of litigation.92 Both the Supreme 
Court and members of Congress have noted that an impending 
execution incentivizes delay.93 Given the frequency with which 
disagreements arise between defendants and their counsel, petitioners 
would have no difficulty formulating a pretext for such motions.94 The 
State warns that if substitution of counsel then becomes widely 
available, capital habeas petitioners would readily exploit this new 
avenue for delay with “Clair motions.”95 
 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 26 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987) (finding that habeas 
petitioners do not have a constitutional right to effective assistance of appointed counsel); 
Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2561 (2010) (stating that Congress is presumed to be aware 
of prevailing law)). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 25–26. 
 90.  Id. at 27. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 21. 
 93.  Id. at 20–21. 
 94.  Id. at 21–22. 
 95.  Id. at 17. 
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In response, Clair advances three primary arguments. First, Clair 
rejects the State’s proposed standard and argues that § 3599’s “roots 
in Section 3006A support the continued use” of the interests-of-
justice standard for both capital and non-capital habeas cases.96 
Second, Clair asserts that there is no basis in either the text or the 
legislative history to believe that Congress wished to depart from this 
familiar and workable standard.97 Third, the interests-of-justice 
standard, properly administered, takes into account all of the State’s 
asserted interests and the capital prisoner’s incentive to delay.98 
Although Clair agrees that special rules govern capital cases, Clair 
frames the alternate structure as Congress’s attempt “to be more 
solicitous of capital defendants’ greater need for the assistance of 
well-qualified counsel.”99 Clair construes the heightened qualifications 
and economic support for counsel in capital cases as evidence that 
Congress “expanded the scope of the right [to post-conviction 
representation] beyond what the Sixth Amendment requires in 
criminal trials.”100 Congress’s intent to “promot[e] fundamental 
fairness in the imposition of the death penalty” by providing capital 
habeas defendants with “quality legal representation,” Clair argues, 
suggests that the Court of Appeals correctly borrowed the interests-
of-justice standard from 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.101 
Clair points out that borrowing the standard from § 3006A follows 
the Supreme Court’s approach in McFarland v. Scott,102 in which the 
Court looked to § 3599’s predecessor in construing the statute.103 Clair 
emphasizes that “[n]othing in the new provision” suggests a departure 
from the interests-of-justice standard that applied to discretionary 
appointment.104 The State’s argument, Clair asserts, requires an 
untenable assumption that “Congress silently made it more difficult 
for a capital defendant to seek substitution of counsel.”105 
 
 
 
 96.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 25. 
 97.  Id. at 21–22. 
 98.  Id. at 31–32. 
 99.  Id. at 21. 
 100.  Id. at 30. 
 101.  Id. at 18, 22 (quoting McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855, 859 (1994)). 
 102.  512 U.S. 849 (1994). 
 103.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 20. 
 104.  Id. at 21. 
 105.  Id. 
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To underscore the appropriateness of the standard, Clair points to 
its “added advantages of familiarity and administrability.”106 The 
standard appears in multiple contexts in criminal adjudication and 
courts of appeals are familiar with reviewing its application for abuses 
of discretion.107 According to Clair, because the interests-of-justice 
standard is so common and workable in the criminal context, “there is 
no basis for concluding that Congress silently prescribed some new 
and different standard for Section 3599.”108 
Clair concedes that the three factors in the State’s test “may well 
be relevant,” but argues that restricting a court’s consideration to 
these factors “has no basis in the statute and makes no practical 
sense.”109 Clair notes that no court has ever adopted a test similar to 
the State’s “novel” three-part test.110 Furthermore, the State “cites no 
language in Section 3599 or Section 3006A to support its exclusive 
three-factor test.”111 According to Clair, the State’s construction would 
render the “express provision” for substitution of counsel “virtually 
meaningless.”112 Because the capital habeas petitioner is statutorily 
entitled to assistance of counsel, a provision that provides for new 
counsel when he has been completely denied his statutory right to 
counsel is superfluous.113 
Clair also argues that the State misinterprets § 2254(i) to bar more 
relief than Congress intended.114 Although the State is correct that 
barring relief on these grounds was unnecessary, Clair argues that 
Congress was simply codifying the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Pennsylvania v. Finley.115 The State’s contrary reading that something 
more was intended is therefore unsupportable.116 If § 2254(i) restricts 
substitution of counsel to the three scenarios the State proposes, non-
capital habeas cases, presumably, would also be subject to this 
standard.117 This result, however, is inconsistent with § 3006A’s 
 
 106.  Id. at 22. 
 107.  Id. at 22–23. 
 108.  Id. at 23. 
 109.  Id. at 24. 
 110.  Id. at 24–25. 
 111.  Id. at 25. 
 112.  Id. at 26. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 28–29. 
 115.  Id. Congress codified Supreme Court holdings throughout AEDPA. Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 29 (noting that § 2254(i) applies to any proceeding under § 2254, including non-
capital habeas cases). 
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provision for substitution of counsel in the interests of justice.118 
Nor does § 2261(e)’s express reservation of the ability to 
substitute counsel on grounds of ineffective assistance suggest that 
such substitution would not be available under § 3599.119 Because § 
2261 also governs certain state post-conviction proceedings, Clair 
construes the reservation as “merely negat[ing] any possible 
implication that Congress intended to preclude trial courts from 
removing and replacing incompetent counsel.”120 Clair argues that this 
stipulation “reinforces that a petitioner in a case ‘arising under section 
2254,’ but subject to the . . . special rules [for expedited capital cases], 
retains the protections that otherwise apply outside” the context of 
expedited cases.121 Such protection includes the ability to substitute 
counsel where consistent with the interests of justice.122 
Finally, Clair contests the State’s prediction that habeas 
petitioners will abuse the lower standard to delay proceedings.123 
Because the interests-of-justice standard does not automatically 
entitle a defendant to appointment of new counsel—the district court 
can exercise its discretion only after due inquiry—Clair claims the 
standard will not result in unwarranted delay.124 Clair argues that 
courts regularly deny substitution of counsel on grounds such as “the 
prospect of unreasonable delay, lack of evidence of a serious 
breakdown of the attorney-client relationship, and any likelihood that 
substitution would be pointless in light of the status of proceedings or 
the weakness of the defendant’s claims.”125 Therefore, exercising 
discretion would include consideration of all of the interests the State 
advances in its challenge to the interests-of-justice standard.126 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Review of the District Court for Abuse of 
Discretion 
According to the State, even if the interests-of-justice standard 
does apply, the district court’s denial of Clair’s motion should stand.127 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 30. 
 123.  Id. at 31. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 31–32. 
 126.  Id. at 31. 
 127.  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 42. 
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The Ninth Circuit’s holding rested on the district court’s lack of 
investigation into Clair’s second request, but the State argues that 
there is no duty to conduct an inquiry unless a conflict of interest is 
alleged.128 Furthermore, the State argues that the Ninth Circuit’s 
formulation of the interests of justice was biased in favor of the 
petitioner because it did not require consideration of the 
countervailing values of finality, comity, and federalism.129 Because the 
Ninth Circuit unnecessarily vacated the district court’s judgment, it is 
apparent that they did not afford proper weight to these competing 
values. Instead, the court should have remanded for a limited inquiry 
under the new district court judge as to whether substitution is 
required in the interests of justice.130 
The State’s proposed application of the interests-of-justice 
standard would require only that counsel comport with due process. 
The State argues that the actions of Clair’s counsel—“filing a petition, 
doing discovery, and conducting an evidentiary hearing”—fully 
comply with the demands of due process.131 Furthermore, the State 
asserts that Clair’s claims regarding untested physical evidence would 
not be relevant to an error at trial, nor would the evidence undermine 
what the State regards as the key piece of evidence—a recorded, 
incriminating conversation between Clair and a witness.132 Even if 
Clair’s counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, Clair could not show the deficiency prejudiced his 
petition.133 
Conversely, Clair argues the Court of Appeals correctly applied 
the abuse-of-discretion standard.134 Clair notes that exercise of 
discretion requires an accurate knowledge of the relevant facts.135 
Furthermore, articulating the effect of those facts is especially 
necessary for appellate review, where discretion involves weighing 
 
 128.  Id. at 40 (citing Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168–76 (2002)). 
 129.  Id. at 45–46. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 47–48. The State cites Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558–59 (1987), to 
support its claim that it is sufficient “if statutorily appointed competent habeas counsel 
conduct[s] independent review of the record and report[s] no arguable issues.” Petitioner’s Brief 
on the Merits, supra note 2, at 48. 
 132.  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 51–52. 
 133.  See id. at 58–59 (“[T]he record makes it clear that the refusal to replace counsel did not 
prejudice Clair.”). 
 134.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 33. 
 135.  Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972)). 
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multiple competing considerations.136 According to Clair, the district 
court did not fulfill either of these obligations, and therefore abused 
its discretion.137 
According to Clair, the district court’s ignorance of all relevant 
facts was apparent in the court’s disparate responses on the two 
occasions Clair complained about his counsel.138 In response to Clair’s 
first letter, the court directed counsel and the State to respond, acting 
only after receiving communication from counsel that the matter had 
been resolved to Clair’s satisfaction.139 In contrast, after receiving 
Clair’s second letter with additional detail and new allegations, “the 
court did not solicit any response from counsel or otherwise 
undertake to inform itself of the surrounding facts.”140 Clair asserts 
that the district court was “obliged to make at least some minimal 
inquiry by asking counsel to respond” in order to make an informed 
decision.141 By failing to do so the court essentially failed to exercise 
its discretion at all.142 
Clair also defends vacating the rejection of his habeas claims and 
rejects the State’s assertion that the remedy entitles him to reopen his 
case.143 Clair argues that the remedy was warranted by “an unusual 
problem posed by the idiosyncratic facts of this case” and would not 
permit an end-run around AEDPA.144 Although remanding solely on 
the question of substitution of counsel ordinarily would be 
appropriate, it would have been inappropriate in Clair’s case because 
his counsel had already withdrawn and his new lawyer had spent five 
years on the case.145 Clair notes that the decision to treat Clair’s 
current counsel as the one that might have been appointed at the time 
does not entitle him to amend his petition or add claims.146 Instead, 
Clair’s requests to amend will be governed by the ordinary standard 
for amending petitions.147 Therefore, the State’s arguments that Clair’s 
possible claims lack substantive merit should be determined by the 
 
 136.  Id. at 33–34 (internal citations omitted). 
 137.  Id. at 34. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 35–36. 
 142.  Id. at 36. 
 143.  Id. at 39, 41. 
 144.  Id. at 39–40. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 40. 
 147.  Id. 
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district court, which will retain the power to deny any motion to 
amend.148 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The Supreme Court is unlikely to limit substitution of counsel in 
habeas proceedings to the three circumstances proposed by the State. 
In addition to Clair’s argument that the test lacks a textual basis,149 the 
standard’s source clearly contemplates “actual or constructive denial 
of counsel” in situations besides those listed by the State.150 The State’s 
standard ignores situations where prejudice is present, but not 
presumed.151 Furthermore, requiring complete abandonment of a 
case152 involves an inferential leap that the State has not justified. To 
say that Congress does not have to provide habeas petitioners with 
“the full panoply”153 of Sixth Amendment rights does not necessitate 
reducing the provision of “quality legal representation”154 to a mere 
independent review of the record.155 Although the State correctly 
notes concerns about abuse and delay,156 it has not shown that its 
proposed standard is necessary to protect those interests.157 
Instead, the Supreme Court likely will adopt the interests-of-
justice standard because it sufficiently accounts for finality, comity, 
and federalism concerns and has support in the legislative history of   
§ 3599. Given that the entitlement to counsel in § 3599 evolved out of 
the discretionary appointment of counsel in § 3006A,158 it makes sense 
 
 148.  Id. at 41. 
 149.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 21–22. 
 150.  See Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (referring to situations besides 
the presumptively prejudicial that may present an actual ineffectiveness claim). 
 151.  See id. at 693 (noting that except in those scenarios where prejudice is presumed, 
“actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a 
general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice”). 
 152.  The State maintains that substitution of counsel is inappropriate in all but three 
circumstances, one of which is complete abandonment of a client. See Petitioner’s Brief on the 
Merits, supra note 2, at 38 (“[C]ounsel does not completely abandon a client as long as counsel 
independently reviews the record of the case.” (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558 
(1987))). 
 153.  Finley, 481 U.S. at 559. 
 154.  McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855 (1994). 
 155.  See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 37 (suggesting that an 
independent review of the record suffices). 
 156.  Id. at 21. 
 157.  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 18–19, Martel v. Clair, No. 10-1265 (U.S. Dec. 
11, 2011) (Sotomayor, J.) (asking the State’s counsel to name one district or circuit court case in 
which its restrictive standard was adopted). 
 158.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 25. 
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to retain the provision’s standard until Congress indicates otherwise. 
It is conceivable that Congress would want to limit incentives for 
delay.159 But Congress recodified § 3599’s predecessor to its present 
location without specifying a new standard for substitution of 
counsel,160 and the interests-of-justice standard is already common in 
the criminal context.161 Therefore, retaining this standard may be the 
most reasonable course.162 Furthermore, as Clair argues, the interests-
of-justice standard is perfectly capable of accommodating concerns 
about delay and abuse.163 
In reviewing the district court’s application of the interests-of-
justice standard, the Ninth Circuit walked a fine line between 
requiring inquiry and requiring second-guessing of litigation strategy. 
Counsel must be entitled to “make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary,”164 but the panel’s emphasis on 
the potential importance of the evidence165 suggests a determination 
about the FPD’s investigative decisions only possible with hindsight.166 
Even though conversing with Clair may have led the FPD to conclude 
that “pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless,”167 the district 
court did not inquire into whether this was indeed the case.168 
 
 159.  Although Clair argues that there is no basis for believing Congress wished to depart 
from that standard, id. at 22–23, that assertion is at odds with Congress’s observation that 
“capital defendants . . . have a unique incentive to keep litigation going by any possible means.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-23 at 10 (1995). 
 160.  See supra note 52. 
 161.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 23. 
 162.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 18–19 (Kennedy, J.) (predicting 
that the standard the Court ultimately formulates will closely resemble the interests-of-justice 
standard). 
 163.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 42; see Lindsay R. Goldstein, A View from the 
Bench: Why Judges Fail to Protect Trust and Confidence in the Lawyer-Client Relationship—An 
Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2678–79 (2005) (suggesting that 
available cases reveal four factors common to analysis of motions to substitute counsel: “(1) the 
timeliness of the motion, (2) the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the matter, (3) the extent 
of the conflict between the attorney and client and whether it was so great that it resulted in a 
total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense, and (4) the balancing of these 
factors with the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice” (quoting 
United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2001))). But see Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 157, at 49 (Alito, J.) (noting that because the interests-of-justice standard is so open 
ended, denying substitution of counsel would seldom constitute an abuse of discretion). 
 164.  Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). 
 165.  Clair v. Ayers, 403 F. App’x 276, 278 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 166.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (holding that in assessing counsel’s performance, courts 
must strive to “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time”). 
 167.  Id. at 691. 
 168.  Id. 
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Furthermore, the FPD’s response to the district court’s first inquiry 
about Clair’s dissatisfaction with his counsel did not evince such a 
conclusion.169 
The inquiry into the application of the standard, therefore, likely 
will turn on whether the Supreme Court considers mandatory inquiry 
too onerous a burden. Clair is likely to prevail on this question. The 
State lists cases to support its proposition that there is no obligation 
to conduct formal inquiries after a defendant’s request for new 
counsel,170 but the selected cases discuss only the duty to investigate 
alleged conflicts of interest.171 Clair argues that the exercise of 
discretion requires an accurate knowledge of the relevant facts, which 
logically suggests that a court should be certain it has those facts 
before exercising discretion.172 This certainty is only possible after at 
least some inquiry. 
The State’s argument with the most traction is that the Ninth 
Circuit should have remanded for a limited inquiry as to whether 
substitution was required in the interests of justice.173 Although Clair’s 
desire for different counsel had become moot, the question whether 
he was entitled to new counsel had not. Presumably, if Clair was not 
entitled to new counsel, then there was no error in denying his habeas 
petition. Regardless of the time that his new counsel spent on the 
case,174 if Clair was not entitled to substitution of counsel at all, his 
claims would still be subject to the more exacting standard of 
successive petitions. This is especially relevant in light of the State’s 
argument that the Ninth Circuit did not consider the countervailing 
values of finality, comity, and federalism.175 Particularly worrisome is 
Clair’s admission, after his first complaint about the FPD, that he 
“may reexamine the issue of representation at the conclusion of the 
proceeding in [the District] Court.”176 Postponing a final decision 
about his counsel until the conclusion of proceedings suggests exactly 
 
 169.  See Joint App’x, supra note 8, at 26–27 (including no mention of a determination that 
investigation was unnecessary). 
 170.  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 40 (citing Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 
162, 168–76 (2002); Wilson v. Parker, 515 F.3d 682, 695 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
 171.  E.g., Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175. 
 172.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 63, at 34. 
 173.  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 46–47. 
 174.  Clair’s new counsel had spent five years on the case when the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. Id. 
 175.  Id. at 45–46. 
 176.  Joint App’x, supra note 8, at 26–27. 
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the gamesmanship the State predicts “Clair motions” will facilitate.177 
There is probably little practical difference, however, between the 
proposed remedies in Clair’s case. The relevance of the unpursued 
physical evidence is the basis for both Clair’s request for new counsel 
and his desire to amend his petition. If the evidence is significant 
enough to allow amending his petition, it is likely that it is significant 
enough that his counsel reasonably should have pursued it, producing 
the same result either way. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although it was the possibility of a flood of “Clair motions” that 
urged settling the question of the standard in the first place, the 
consequences of the Ninth Circuit’s holding are unlikely to be so dire. 
If the remedy the Ninth Circuit fashioned was not limited to the 
unique circumstances of Clair’s case, more concern might be 
warranted. Properly applied, however, the interests-of-justice 
standard should prevent end-runs around AEDPA and adequately 
protect the interest in finality. 
 
 
 177.  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 2, at 17. The State’s concerns about 
gamesmanship were a centerpiece of oral arguments, at which some of the Justices appeared 
dissatisfied with the notion that Clair could invoke a duty to inquire into the attorney-client 
relationship at such a late stage; or concerned that the Ninth Circuit’s remand placed Clair in a 
better position than he would have been had counsel been substituted in the original 
proceedings. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 45–47 (Roberts, J.) 
(questioning whether the motion would allow petitioners to “circumvent various restrictions”); 
id. at 50–53 (Kagan, J., and Alito, J.) questioning the practical difference new counsel would 
have made). 
